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Conﬂict resolutionWe report experiments designed to learn whether different kinds of perceptually unstable visual images engage
different neural mechanisms. 21 subjects viewed two types of bi-stable images while we scanned the activity in
their brainswith functionalmagnetic resonance imaging (fMRI); in one (intra-categorical type) the two percepts
remained within the same category (e.g. face–face) while in the other (cross-categorical type) they crossed cat-
egorical boundaries (e.g. face–body). The results showed that cross- and intra-categorical reversals share a com-
mon reversal-related neural circuitry, which includes fronto-parietal cortex and primary visual cortex (area V1).
Cross-categorical reversals alone engaged additional areas, notably anterior cingulate cortex and superior tempo-
ral gyrus, which have been posited to be involved in conﬂict resolution.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
In trying to obtain knowledge about the external world, the brain
employs two strategies; one consists of stabilizing the world by
discarding all the superﬂuous and inconstant changes, one example of
which is the generation of constant colours, which makes the brain in-
dependent of the continual changes in wavelength-energy composition
of the light reﬂected from objects and surfaces (Land, 1974; Zeki, 1980),
thus giving us knowledge about them through their colour. But there
are also stimuli whose conﬁguration is such that they are sources of un-
certain knowledge since they remain open tomore than one interpreta-
tion, classic examples being the Necker Cube and the Rubin Vase. To
allow for the uncertain knowledge derived from such perceptually un-
stable stimuli, the brain appears to have evolved another strategy — a
system that is stable in its instability, in the sense that it can allow for
more than one interpretation of a stimulus even when higher cognitive
factors impel the interpretation in one direction (Zeki, 2008). This phe-
nomenonhas been especially useful in investigatingneural systems that
correlate with the conscious perception of objects and previous neuro-
imaging studies have shown that frontal and parietal cortex and func-
tionally specialized visual areas are engaged in all perceptual reversals
(e.g. Andrews and Schluppeck, 2004; Kanai et al., 2010; Kleinschmidt
et al., 1998; Lumer et al., 1998).
Bi-stable ﬁgures can be divided broadly into two sub-types, those
showing intra-categorical and those showing cross-categorical reversals.
TheNecker cube belongs to the former: it is perceived as oneobject (cat-
egory) that can be in one of two recessional states. The Rubin@ucl.ac.uk (S. Zeki).
. Open access under CC BY license.vase belongs to the cross-categorical variety, in that it can alternate per-
ceptually between two categories (face andvase). In both, there is an ob-
ligate bi-stability (and an obligate multi-stability in others) since it is
difﬁcult, if not impossible, to prevent the transition from one state to
the other; both are perceptually “correct” at any given moment and
each occupies sovereignly the conscious perceptual stage for a given
moment before the other interpretation replaces it to supervene. This
makes it especially interesting to compare the brain activity produced
by the two types of bi-stability. The cross-categorical transition results
in a conﬂict condition since the perceptual transition is between two dif-
ferent categories; by contrast, the transition in intra-categorical exam-
ples is only a change from one state to another of the same category
(object) and hence introduces no categorical conﬂict in what the
image is, but only in its conﬁguration. In this study, we thereforewanted
to learn whether the same neural circuits are engaged in the two kinds
of bi-stability. Our working hypothesis was that intra-categorical and
cross-categorical bi-stability will both engage the same fronto-parietal
areas but that the cross-categorical bi-stability will engage cortical
areas that have been shown to be prominently engaged in conﬂict reso-
lution, principally the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). We hypothesized
further that activity in the ACC would be restricted to the reversal phase
of the unstable images, since it is then alone that a conﬂict arises about
the knowledge derived from the stimulus. Hence our study was speciﬁ-
cally focused on the engagement of the ACC in the two kinds of obligate
bi-stability, to learn whether activity in it would allow us to distinguish
neurologically between the two kinds of perceptual transition.
To do so, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
scan brain activity when subjects viewed both types of bi-stable ﬁgures
and indicated when their percepts alternated between two interpreta-
tions; this allowed us to distinguish between activity that correlates
with the reported perceptual reversal for both types of stimuli.
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Subjects
21 healthy right-handed volunteers (9 male, 12 female, mean age
23.7 years) participated. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and none had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorder. Written
informed consent was obtained from all. The study was approved by
the Ethics Committee of University College London and conforms with
the Code of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of
Helsinki; printed in the British Medical Journal 18 July 1964). All data
was anonymized.
Procedure
Subjects were instructed to report repetitively their perception of vi-
sual stimuli during stimulus presentation and to press one of two but-
tons with their right hand to indicate one or the other of the two
possible directions of perceptual transitions. After reporting a transition,
they kept the key pressedwhile the ensuing perceptwas stable.We cal-
culatedmiddle-points for each time-interval between each button press
and release (that is, during the period when subjects' perception was
stable) and used these as the onsets for stable perception in an event-
related analysis (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998). Subjects' reports thus de-
ﬁned the occurrence of perceptual reversals and the presence of stable
perceptions. There were, therefore, two critical time-points, when a re-
versal occurred and when perception was stable.Fig. 1.Upper panel: examples of bi-stable ﬁgures used in the experiment. To the left, a face–body
stabile ﬁgure is one for intra-categorical reversal. Middle panel: illustrative example of respons
spond to one percept and orange ones to another. Lower panel: the distributions of grand ave
show the ﬁtted gamma distribution.We used a variety of bi-stable ﬁgures belonging to two classes of
stimuli: in one class (cross-categorical) were stimuli for which percep-
tion alternates between one category and another (e.g. between a face
and a body or a vase and faces, see Fig. 1) while in the other (intra-
categorical) class were stimuli in which the transition is between two
percepts belonging to the same category (e.g. from one face to another,
see Fig. 1). Table 1 provides all stimulus categories used in the experi-
ment. Preceding the fMRI experiments, participants viewed all bi-
stable ﬁgures and familiarised themselves with the stimuli. At the be-
ginning of each trial in the scanning sessions, subjects were informed
what stimulus categories would appear in the coming trial, with an in-
struction for which button to press to indicate their percepts (e.g.
“Face = left button, Body= right button”). The stimuli covered approxi-
mately 8° × 8° of the visual ﬁeld and included a central ﬁxation cross.
Inter-reversal time-spans can be controlled with parameters that
depend on stimulus type, visual ﬁeld coverage and ﬁxation point
(Borsellino et al., 1982; Kleinschmidt et al., 1998). These stimulus set-
tings followed a previous study using bi-stable ﬁgures (Kleinschmidt
et al., 1998). All stimuli were grey-scaled pictures and the brightness
of eachwas adjusted to the averaged brightness of all. Stimulus presen-
tation lasted for 60 s followed by a 20 s ﬁxation period duringwhich the
ﬁxation cross was presented on a black background. Subjects were
instructed to ﬁxate the cross throughout scanning. There were 8 stimuli
for each reversal condition, resulting in 16 experimental stimuli in total.
The experiment consisted of 4 scanning sessions and each session had 4
stimuli. The order of the stimulus presentation and button-pressing
were counterbalanced across subjects. Number of reversals andbi-stabile ﬁgure is an example of cross-categorical reversal, and to the right, a face–face bi-
es while viewing a bi-stable stimulus, derived from one subject's data. Blue phases corre-
raged inter-reversal times (durations of percepts) reported by participants. The blue lines
Table 1
A breakdown of the stimulus categories used and the reversals experienced. The upper
panel shows the number of stimuli in each group (e.g. face–face) within the two major
categories. Thus there were, for example, 4 trials in which stimuli entailing face–face
reversals were presented whereas there were 3 trials during which stimuli leading to
face–body reversals were presented. The lower panels show the number of times the
participants could report perceiving the different categories. Within the 8 trials, the
maximum possible number of trials during which a face was perceived was 4 (intra-
categorical). To the right, the maximum number of trials during which a face could be
perceived was 6 (face–body and face–object); the maximum number of trials during
which an object could be perceived was 5, and so on.
Intra-categorical reversal Cross-categorical reversal
Face–face 4 Face–body 3
Body–body 2 Face–object 3
Object–object 2 Body–object 2
Trials in which face(s)
was perceived
4 Trials in which face(s)
was perceived
6
Trials in which body(s)
was perceived
2 Trials in which body(s)
was perceived
5
Trials in which object(s)
was perceived
2 Trials in which object(s)
was perceived
5
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were analysed using t-tests.
Functional image acquisition and analysis
Scanning data was acquired in a 3-T Siemens Magnetom Trio MRI
scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) ﬁtted with a 12-channel head-
coil. An echo-planar imaging sequence was applied for functional
scans to obtain blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal (TR =
68 ms, TE = 30 ms, matrix size = 64 × 64) using 48 slices to cover
thewhole brain. The voxel resolutionwas 3 × 3mm in-plane resolution,
with a 2 mm slice thickness and 1 mm inter-slice gap. High-resolution
T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired at the end of experi-
mental sessions for each subject (176 slices, resolution 1 × 1 × 1 mm,
TE = 2.48 ms, TR = 7.92 ms). Field maps were also acquired with
Siemens standard gradient-echo ﬁeld map sequence for correcting geo-
metric distortion of echo-planar imaging (EPI) images (Hutton et al.,
2002).We also recorded the heart and respiration rates for each subject.
All data were analysed using SPM8 (Statistical Parametric Mapping
http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). The EPI images for
each subject were realigned and normalized intoMontreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) space, smoothed using Gaussian smoothing kernel of
9 × 9 × 9 mm, and ﬁltered with a high-pass cutoff (128 s) to remove
drift terms. The stimulus for each subject was modelled as a set of re-
gressors in a general linear model (GLM) ﬁrst-level (within subject)
analysis.
The study used an event-related design which models the evoked
haemodynamic responses for events (key-presses indicating perceptual
reversal and calculated onsets indicating stable perception) as delta
functions convolvedwith a canonical haemodynamic response function
with time and dispersion derivatives to provide regressors for the GLM.
Head movement parameters calculated from the realignment pre-
processing step and physiological recordings (heart rate, respiration)
were included as regressors of no interest. We carried out categorical
contrast analyses encoding the same data in two ways. For the ﬁrst we
used separate stimulus functions for reversal and stable events and
pooled all events regardless of category, while for the second categorical
analysis we used separate stimulus functions for cross-categorical and
intra-categorical reversal and stable events. Contrast images were
taken to second-level (between subject) t-tests to produce summary
t-statistical maps at the group level.
We report cluster level activations signiﬁcant at p b 0.05 family wise
error (FWE) corrected, although some of these (indicated in the tables)
were signiﬁcant at peak level at p b 0.05 FWE corrected. In cases where
we had a priori knowledge of an area's involvement, we used a small
volume correction (SVC) of 16 mm, p b 0.05 corrected at voxel level,using coordinates given in previous studies (Kanai et al., 2008;
Knapen et al., 2011).
In post-hoc sessions, eye-movements were measured in six subjects
by using an eyetracker (Eyelink system, SR Research, Berlin, Germany)
in the fMRI scanner. The eye-movement data was calibrated with nine
points and sampled at 250 Hz. The data were classiﬁed according to
the two reversal conditions.
Results
Behavioural data
All subjects reported frequent perceptual reversals when viewing
the stimuli. Inter-reversal times for each condition, while individually
variable, are strongly shifted toward the left and can be approximated
by gammadistributions shown in Fig. 1,which is a typical feature of per-
ceptual reversal phenomena (see Taylor and Aldridge, 1974; Leopold
and Logothetis, 1999 for reviews). There was no signiﬁcant difference
between intra- and cross-categorical conditions in the number of rever-
sals (intra-categorical, mean = 9.1, cross-categorical, mean = 9.81,
p N 0.05) and the durations of percepts (intra-categorical, mean =
7.4 s, cross-categorical, mean = 6.8 s, p N 0.05).
fMRI data
Our speciﬁc aim was to learn whether, in addition to the fronto-
parietal cortex, which appears to be engaged during all types of percep-
tual reversal, the ACC is differentially involved in the two types of rever-
sal. We used (1) the contrast perceptual reversal N perceptual stability to
chart general brain activations that correlate with perceptual switching
and (2) the contrast cross-categorical perceptual reversals N intra-
categorical perceptual reversals to chart brain regions that are especially
active in cross-categorical perceptual reversals.We also used a conjunc-
tion analysis (Price and Friston, 1997) to characterize brain activations
common to both types of perceptual reversal using the contrast [cross-
categorical reversal N cross-categorical stability] and [intra-categorical
reversal N intra-categorical stability]. We also report activations for
each of the following contrasts; cross-categorical reversal N cross-
categorical stability and intra-categorical reversal N intra-categorical
stability. Activations for all contrasts are summarized in Table 2.
Perceptual reversal vs perceptual stability
(a) The contrast perceptual reversal N perceptual stability for both
categories of stimulus led to activation in bilateral inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG) and right intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (Fig. 2), which have
been reported to be active in previous studies using ambiguous (intra-
categorical) ﬁgures like the Necker cube (e.g. Pitts et al., 2007) and bi-
stable stimuli (Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Leopold and Logothetis,
1999; Lumer et al., 1998, inter alia). These fronto-parietal activations
may reﬂect top-down processes that initiate a reorganization of activity
throughout the visual cortex during perceptual reversals (Leopold and
Logothetis, 1999). Activation in the primary visual cortex (V1)
(encroaching upon cuneus and parahippocampal gyrus), previously re-
ported forﬁgure-ground reversal (Polonsky et al., 2000) and during bin-
ocular rivalry (Parkkonen et al., 2008),was also found. In addition, there
was activation in bilateral anterior insula and the ACC, areas which, to-
gether with the front-parietal cortex, are thought to play a role in visual
awareness (Rees, 2007).
(b) The contrast perceptual stability N perceptual reversal for both
categories of stimulus led to activity in the following areas: occipital
and parietal cortex, including lingual gyrus (probably area V3) andmid-
dle occipital gyrus bilaterally, the supplementary motor area and
paracentral area. The role of V1 in perceptual reversal is controversial
(de-Wit et al., 2012); there are contradictory suggestions as to whether
it is engaged during perceptual reversal (e.g. Polonsky et al., 2000) or
Table 2
Activated areas correlating with perceptual reversal and stability. Locations, MNI co-ordinates, cluster size and values for the activations produced by the contrasts: Perceptual reversal N
perceptual stability, Perceptual stability N perceptual reversal, Cross-categorical reversal N intra-categorical reversal, and (Cross-categorical reversal N cross-categorical stability) + (intra-
categorical reversal N intra-categorical stability), Cross-categorical reversal N cross-categorical stability, and Intra-categorical reversal N intra-categorical stability. All activations are cluster
level signiﬁcant at p b 0.05 (corrected), although some of these were also signiﬁcant at peak level. Wherewe had a priori knowledge of an area's involvement, we applied a small volume















x {mm} y {mm} z {mm}
Perceptual reversal N perceptual stability
Calcarine gyrus R 0.000 1923 0.000 0.000 9.438 5.762 0.000 18 −67 7
Lingual gyrus R 0.002 8.215 5.374 0.000 9 −58 −8
Lingual gyrus R 0.003 8.062 5.321 0.000 24 −49 −8
Insula R 0.000 115 0.000 0.026 6.935 4.895 0.000 30 20 −11
Insula R 0.490 5.315 4.148 0.000 36 26 1
Putamen R 0.760 4.878 3.914 0.000 30 5 10
Superior temporal gyrus R 0.000 218 0.000 0.051 6.616 4.762 0.000 48 −46 13
Middle temporal gyrus R 0.236 5.845 4.413 0.000 60 −46 10
Anterior cingulate cortex L 0.000 290 0.000 0.078 6.418 4.676 0.000 −3 32 22
Anterior cingulate cortex R 0.118 6.227 4.591 0.000 9 32 22
Inferior frontal gyrus R 0.002 89 0.000 0.249 5.808 4.395 0.000 48 11 7
Inferior frontal gyrus L 0.039 48 0.003 0.333 5.608 4.297 0.000 −33 26 −2
Intraparietal sulcus R 0.022 37 0.003 0.011 4.235 3.640 0.000 30 −61 55
Perceptual stability N perceptual reversal
Supplementary motor area L 0.000 168 0.000 0.002 8.206 5.371 0.000 −6 2 64
Precentral gyrus L 0.000 230 0.000 0.004 7.851 5.246 0.000 −33 −22 58
Lingual gyrus R 0.000 359 0.000 0.020 7.065 4.947 0.000 24 −88 −5
Middle occipital gyrus R 0.086 6.370 4.655 0.000 33 −88 4
Inferior occipital gyrus L 0.000 410 0.000 0.089 6.355 4.648 0.000 −24 −88 −8
Paracentral lobule R 0.000 213 0.000 0.176 6.038 4.504 0.000 9 −25 70
Precentral gyrus R 0.011 65 0.001 0.528 5.252 4.116 0.000 57 −1 40
Cross-categorical reversal N intra-categorical reversal
Anterior cingulate cortex – 0.020 81 0.003 0.767 3.895 3.715 0.000 0 17 28
Superior temporal gyrus R 0.002 138 0.000 0.015 5.347 4.929 0.000 60 −49 1
Inferior frontal gyrus SVC L 48 0.011 4.235 3.640 0.000 −30 21 −3
(Cross-categorical reversal N cross-categorical stability) and (intra-categorical reversal N intra-categorical stability)
Inferior frontal gyrus R 0.032 72 0.004 0.421 4.238 4.013 0.000 51 23 −5
Intraparietal sulcus R 0.003 22 0.081 0.002 4.110 3.910 0.000 21 −49 43
Lingual gyrus R 0.000 1290 0.000 0.003 5.797 5.281 0.000 21 −52 −5
Lingual gyrus L 0.005 5.643 5.161 0.000 −21 −55 1
Calcarine gyrus L 0.009 5.476 5.031 0.000 −12 −73 10
Cross-categorical reversal N cross-categorical stability
Lingual gyrus R 0.000 1290 0.000 0.003 5.797 5.281 0.000 21 −52 −5
Lingual gyrus L 0.005 5.643 5.161 0.000 −21 −55 1
Calcarine gyrus L 0.009 5.476 5.031 0.000 −12 −73 10
Superior temporal gyrus R 0.002 138 0.000 0.015 5.347 4.929 0.000 60 −49 1
Inferior frontal gyrus R 0.032 72 0.004 0.421 4.238 4.013 0.000 51 23 −5
Anterior cingulate cortex 0.020 81 0.003 0.767 3.895 3.715 0.000 0 17 28
Intraparietal sulcus SVC R 0.003 22 0.081 0.002 4.110 3.910 0.000 21 −49 43
Intra-categorical reversal N intra-categorical stability
Lingual gyrus R 0.000 1159 0.000 0.000 6.510 5.810 0.000 21 −52 −8
Lingual gyrus L 0.000 6.380 5.720 0.000 −18 −49 −5
Lingual gyrus L 0.004 5.700 5.210 0.000 −24 −58 −2
Inferior frontal gyrus R 0.022 55 0.004 0.611 4.238 4.013 0.000 47 22 −9
Intraparietal sulcus SVC R 0.004 17 0.121 0.011 3.600 3.450 0.000 24 −58 58
206 T. Ishizu, S. Zeki / NeuroImage 91 (2014) 203–209not (e.g. Kleinschmidt et al., 1998) (see also discussion). In this study,
activations in visual cortex with perceptual stability were located
ventrolaterally (24−88−5;−24−88−8) outside V1, while those in-
duced by perceptual reversal were in V1 (18 −67 7; 24 −49 −8).
Kleinschmidt et al. (1998) reported activationswith perceptual stability
at similar coordinates, whereas the locations of activation reported in
the studies of Polonsky et al. (2000) and Parkkonen et al. (2008) are lo-
cated in V1 and thus posterior relative to our activation foci.
Other activations are summarised in Table 2.
Cross- and intra-categorical conditions
Ourmain interest was to learn whether there are any signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in the pattern of cortical activation produced by cross-
categorical reversals as opposed to intra-categorical ones and in partic-
ular whether the ACC is involved in one but not the other.Areas uniquely active in each kind of reversal: the signiﬁcant differ-
ence in activation between the two types of reversal may be summa-
rized as follows: ACC and right superior temporal gyrus (STG) were
engaged during cross-categorical but not intra-categorical reversal
(Fig. 2). In addition to its involvement in visual awareness (Rees,
2007), the ACC is also engaged in a wide range of cognitive tasks
(Botvinick et al., 2001; 2004 for reviews), including ones which involve
conﬂict (e.g. Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter et al., 1995; Raichle et al.,
1994). Previous neuroimaging studies using Stroop tasks or audio
dichoptic competition have suggested that the STG is also involved in
conﬂict resolution (e.g. Falkenberg et al., 2011; Pardo et al., 1990). By
contrast, there was no comparable unique activation in the intra-
categorical reversal contrast, which shared all activations with the
cross-categorical one at the signiﬁcance level (see common activations
below). It should be noted that there was no activity in the ACC and
STG with both types of stability.
Fig. 2. Upper panel shows sites that were active during cross-categorical reversals and lower panel shows ones active during both cross- and intra-categorical reversals. Statistical para-
metricmaps rendered onto canonical anatomical sections showing t-statistics. Randomeffects analysiswith 21 subjects. Display threshold p b 0.001 (uncorrected). ACC, anterior cingulate
cortex (0 17 28); STG, superior temporal gyrus (60−49 1); IFG, inferior frontal gyrus (51 23−5); IPS, intraparietal sulcus (21−49 43); V1, primary visual cortex (−12−73 10).
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niﬁcant similarities in the activation between the two types of reversal,
whichmay be summarised as follows: IFG and IPS (fronto-parietal area)
and V1 (Fig. 2). The latter was previously reported to be active during
the viewing of multi-stable reversal stimuli (e.g. Tong et al., 2006)
(see also discussion).
Eye-movement tracking data revealed indistinguishable gaze pat-
terns between the two reversal conditions, suggesting that the differ-
ences in the activation patterns produced by the two reversal
conditions cannot be accounted for by eye-movement patterns during
the perceptual reversals.Discussion
For the purposes of the present study, we have divided ambiguous
stimuli into two broad types, those in which the reversals do not cross
categorical boundaries and those that do, to learn the extent to which
the two engage different neural mechanisms. Past studies have shown
that reversals of both kinds engage the fronto-parietal cortex but,
given their profound perceptual difference, it seemed reasonable to ex-
pect that, beyond the basic neural mechanisms engaged in reversals in
general, there might be additional differences related to the type of re-
versal. More speciﬁcally, the crossing of categorical boundaries intro-
duces a conﬂict as to which category a stimulus belongs to – a conﬂict
that is, by its nature, only temporarily resolved perceptually – while
an intra-categorical transition does not produce a conﬂict between per-
ceptual categories but only between different states or conﬁgurations of
the same category of object. We thus focussed our study on the possible
involvement of the ACC, known from previous studies to be involved in
conﬂict resolution. Collectively, our results show that, as expected,
cross- and intra-categorical reversals share a common reversal-related
neural circuitry but additional areas, notably the ACC and the STG, are
recruited in cross-categorical reversals alone. We begin by discussing
the general activation produced by both types of ambiguous stimuli be-
fore discussing more speciﬁcally the central results.Area V1
Although not the major results of this study, the activity in area V1
raises interesting questions: For both intra- and cross-categorical stim-
uli, we observed activation in V1 with perceptual reversal N perceptual
stability but not for the reverse contrast. It is as if V1 is engaged in the
sensory conﬁguration of the visual stimulus but not in the interpretation
of the stable percept. Although previous electrophysiological and some
early fMRI studies did not report V1 activation with perceptual transi-
tions (e.g. Kleinschmidt et al., 1998; Leopold and Logothetis, 1999;
Lumer et al., 1998), many neuroimaging studies using fMRI andmagne-
toencephalography have suggested that V1 may be engaged in various
bi-stable percepts, including binocular rivalry (Polonsky et al., 2000;
Tong and Engel, 2001), apparentmotion (Seghier et al., 2000) and static
illusory contours (Muckli et al., 2009). This inconsistency may be ex-
plained by general differences in methodologies (Sterzer et al., 2009).
It is known that neuronal spiking activity is less closely related to per-
ceptual awareness than local ﬁeld potentials (Wilke et al., 2006),
which correlates more with the BOLD signal (Logothetis et al., 2001).
The current results support the involvement of V1 in perceptual reversal
but not in perceptual stability, by showing that V1 is co-activated with
fronto-parietal cortex during perceptual reversals alone. However, the
causal and temporal relationship between V1 and fronto-parietal cortex
during perceptual reversal is still unclear. Transcranial magnetic stimu-
lation and fMRI connectivity analysis (Kanai et al., 2010; Sterzer and
Kleinschmidt, 2007) suggest that fronto-parietal cortex may play a cru-
cial role in perceptual reversal by sending signals to sensory areas but
whether activity in fronto-parietal cortex is antecedent to V1 activity
or subsequent to it remains unclear.ACC, STG and cross-categorical reversals
Returning to the main aims of this study, we found, as we had
hypothesised, that activity within the ACC is restricted to cross-
categorical reversals alone, not during perceptually stable states. Our
208 T. Ishizu, S. Zeki / NeuroImage 91 (2014) 203–209measurements conﬁrmed that this activity cannot be accounted for by
eye-movements. Hence the activitymust be limited in duration to condi-
tions in which neither percept supervenes, resulting in the creation of a
perceptual conﬂict. In light of this, we suggest that the activation of ACC
(andSTG) reﬂects a conﬂict inmatching between twopossible perceptu-
al interpretations of the stimulus. The only previous fMRI study of the
neural correlates of perceptual reversal in complex bi-stable ﬁgures
(Kleinschmidt et al., 1998) did not aim to distinguish between cross-
and intra-categorical reversals and therefore did not report activation
in the ACC. Perceptual reversal is not unique to the visual modality; it
also occurs in the auditory one (e.g. Kashino and Kondo, 2012) and the
two may share, at least partially, a common neural circuitry during per-
ceptual reversal (Kondo et al., 2012; Sterzer et al., 2009). Both, for exam-
ple, engage the sensory areas (auditory cortex in the case of auditory
stimuli and visual cortex for visual stimuli) and parietal cortex (Sterzer
et al., 2009; Kashino andKondo, 2012 for a review). They also apparently
share the common feature that, where the bi-stability crosses categorical
boundaries, the ACC is involved, sincewith auditory instability theACC is
only engaged with so-called verbal transformation effects (Sato et al.,
2004). For example, when a word such as “life” is repeated rapidly and
continuously listeners' perception of the word will alter between ‘life’
and ‘ﬂy’ (e.g. Warren and Gregory, 1958). There may in fact be further
analogies between them. A tone is a tone and a face is a face, but ‘life’
is not ‘ﬂy’ and a ‘face’ is not a ‘vase’; hence they belong to different ‘con-
ceptual’ categories within the two sensory domains. We therefore pro-
pose that, in addition to the activation of general reversal-related
neural circuits, the ACC comes into play when the two interpretations
belong to different conceptual categories and lead to conceptual conﬂict,
no matter what the source is (see also Fig. 3 for a summary diagram).
In addition to the ACC, the STG was also only active in cross-
categorical instability. The STG is a multi-functional region which is
thought to play a role in insight problem solving (Bowden et al., 2005)
and attention control (Wojciulik and Kanwisher, 1999); interestingly
it has also been reported to be engaged in conﬂict solving (Falkenberg
et al., 2011; Pardo et al., 1990).
Conﬂict resolution
The restriction of ACC and STG activity to phases of reversal in cross-
categorical transitions raises a number of issues. It is, ﬁrst, important toFig. 3. Summary diagram. A proposed hypothetical scheme to illustrate brainmechanisms
underlying perceptual reversal. Lower panel shows brain areas involved commonly in all
types of reversals, cross- and intra-categorical (V1, IPS, and IFG). Upper panel shows areas
involved in cross-categorical reversal alone (STG and ACC). The temporal relationship be-
tween the two mechanisms is unclear.note that a change in the stimulus itself does not necessarily trigger a re-
sponse in these two areas. For example, when thewavelength composi-
tion of light reﬂected from the coloured patches of a Mondrian display
changes continually, without leading to a change in perceived colour
(though there is a change in hue), the ACC and the STG are not engaged
(Bartels and Zeki, 2000). Hence, it appears that these two areas are en-
gaged only when the stimulus is neurally, but not veridically, unstable,
and only when it crosses categorical boundaries. Next comes the ques-
tion of conﬂict resolution. When we speak of it in this context, we are
of course intending that the conﬂict is only resolved momentarily, for
a period of seconds or minutes — when one perceptual state super-
venes; for periods in excess of that, the conﬂict is not resolved, for the
reversion from one state to the other is continuous, and subjects know
that they are viewing an unstable stimulus, even if it is momentarily re-
solved. Hence it is more appropriate in our context to speak, not of a
conﬂict resolution, but of the presence of a conﬂict during certain limit-
ed time intervals, which are resolved perceptually at others. Our results,
which show that the ACC and the STG are only recruited during the un-
stable, reversal, state and not during the stable one, suggest that activity
in these areas is perceptually driven, is ‘short term’ and is not inﬂuenced
by cognitive knowledge about the instability of the stimuli. Indeed, pre-
vious studies have shown that ACC activity ismore closely related to de-
tecting conﬂict in the stimulus, possibly in relation to action selection,
than to top-down control (for review, see Botvinick et al., 2004). This
raises on the one hand the question of the temporal relationship be-
tween the areas that are active in reversals in general (including V1
and fronto-parietal cortex) and those that are active uniquely during
cross-categorical reversals (ACC and STG). On the other hand, it also
raises the question of the relationship, both temporal and physiological,
between activity in ACC and STG and higher cognitive areas that are the
repository of knowledge about the nature of the stimulus — that is
whether it is a perceptually stable or unstable stimulus and whether it
crosses a categorical boundary or not. Put more simply, activity in ACC
and STG in this study appears to be perceptually driven and persists
even in the knowledge that the stimulus is unstable. This, in turn, raises
another interesting question that we intend to pursue, namely the dif-
ference in terms of cortical activity between perceptually unstable stim-
uli of the kindwe have used here andperceptually stable but cognitively
(or affectively) unstable stimuli. Examples of the latter are many, and
can be found in many works of art (of which Vermeer's paintings pro-
vide a good example), where a single perceptually stable image can be
given different interpretations during one viewing and between one
viewing and another. Whether the ACC and the STG are also involved
when viewing perceptually stable but cognitively unstable images is
an intriguing question for future studies.
Linguistic conﬂict in cross-categorical transitions
Cross-categorical reversals inevitably lead to a linguistic conﬂict (“is
it a face or a vase?”) and, correspondingly, we found activity within left
IFG (Broca's area) with the application of an SVC in the contrast cross-
categorical reversal N cross-categorical stable, but not in the contrast
intra-categorical reversal N intra-categorical stable. The STG, which was
equally uniquely active in cross-categorical transitions, is also involved
in lexical access and activity in it reﬂects readiness to engage semantic
activation guided by top-down processes, for example, those associated
with the ACC (Jung-Beeman, 2005; Tian et al., 2011). Here again, the
question of a temporal relationship between activity in ACC and STG
on the one hand and higher areas, which dictate the interpretation to
be given to a perceptually stable image, becomes one of much interest.
Cross-categorical and intra-categorical transitions
Finally, there is the question of why ACC and STG activity should be
restricted to cross-categorical transitions. One answer is that cross-
categorical transitions result in a categorical conﬂict whereas the
209T. Ishizu, S. Zeki / NeuroImage 91 (2014) 203–209intra-categorical ones do not. If the activity in ACC reﬂects conﬂict reso-
lution in the context of action selection (Botvinick et al., 2004 for a
review), then it stands to reason that there is amore radical action selec-
tion process involved with unstable stimuli that belong to different cat-
egories than ones inwhich the two states belong to the same category of
stimulus and, correspondingly, more enhanced activity in ACC and STG
with cross-categorical perceptual reversals. Yet these answers raise im-
portant issues. Somehow, the activity in ACC and STG must be ﬁnely
regulated from two sources: lower areas such as V1 or auditory cortex
which signal that the conﬂict is perceptually driven, and higher (cogni-
tive) sources which must be relatively inactive or suppressed, to indi-
cate that the conﬂict is perceptual and does not lie in a cognitive
instability. It is for this reason that this study is only a prelude to the
more demanding task of learning if, and how, ACC, STG and possibly
other areas are involved during the experience of perceptually stable
but cognitively unstable stimuli. Thus, taken together, the present
study expands on previous knowledge on the neural basis of bi-stable
perception and raises important issues for future ones.
Acknowledgments
This studywas supported by theWellcome Trust, London.We thank
John Romaya for his helpful comments.
Conﬂict of interest
The authors declare no conﬂict of interest.
References
Andrews, T.J., Schluppeck, D., 2004. Neural responses to Mooney images reveal a modular
representation of faces in human visual cortex. Neuroimage 21, 91–98.
Bartels, A., Zeki, S., 2000. The architecture of the colour centre in the human visual brain:
new results and a review. Eur. J. Neurosci. 12, 172–193.
Borsellino, A., Carlini, F., Riani, M., Tuccio, M.T., De Marco, A., Penengo, P., Trabucco, A.,
1982. Effects of visual angle on perspective reversal for ambiguous patterns. Percep-
tion 11, 263–273.
Botvinick, M.M., Braver, T.S., Barch, D.M., Carter, C.S., Cohen, J.D., 2001. Conﬂict monitoring
and cognitive control. Psychol. Rev. 108, 624–652.
Botvinick, M.M., Cohen, J.D., Carter, C.S., 2004. Conﬂict monitoring and anterior cingulate
cortex: an update. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 539–546.
Bowden, E.M., Jung-Beeman, M., Fleck, J., Kounios, J., 2005. New approaches to
demystifying insight. Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 322–328.
Carter, C.S., Mintun,M., Cohen, J.D., 1995. Interference and facilitation effects during selective
attention: an H215O PET study of Stroop task performance. Neuroimage 2, 264–272.
de-Wit, L.H., Kubilius, J., Wagemans, J., Op de Beeck, H.P., 2012. Bistable Gestalts reduce
activity in the whole of V1, not just the retinotopically predicted parts. J. Vis. 12, 12.
Falkenberg, L.E., Specht, K., Westerhausen, R., 2011. Attention and cognitive control net-
works assessed in a dichotic listening fMRI study. Brain Cogn. 76, 276–285.
Hutton, C., Bork, A., Josephs, O., Deichmann, R., Ashburner, J., Turner, R., 2002. Image dis-
tortion correction in fMRI: a quantitative evaluation. Neuroimage 16, 217–240.
Jung-Beeman, M., 2005. Bilateral brain processes for comprehending natural language.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 9, 512–518.
Kanai, R., Muggleton, N.G., Walsh, V., 2008. TMS over the intraparietal sulcus induces per-
ceptual fading. J. Neurophysiol. 100, 3343–3350.
Kanai, R., Bahrami, B., Rees, G., 2010. Human parietal cortex structure predicts individual
differences in perceptual rivalry. Curr. Biol. 20, 1626–1630.Kashino, M., Kondo, H.M., 2012. Functional brain networks underlying perceptual
switching: auditory streaming and verbal transformations. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
Lond. B Biol. Sci. 367, 977–987.
Kleinschmidt, A., Buchel, C., Zeki, S., Frackowiak, R.S., 1998. Human brain activity during
spontaneously reversing perception of ambiguous ﬁgures. Proc. Biol. Sci. 265,
2427–2433.
Knapen, T., Brascamp, J., Pearson, J., van Ee, R., Blake, R., 2011. The role of frontal and pa-
rietal brain areas in bistable perception. J. Neurosci. 31, 10293–10301.
Kondo, H.M., Kitagawa, N., Kitamura, M.S., Koizumi, A., Nomura, M., Kashino, M., 2012.
Separability and commonality of auditory and visual bistable perception. Cereb.
Cortex 22, 1915–1922.
Land, E., 1974. The retinex theory of colour vision. Proceedings of the Royal Institution of
Great Britain. , 47, pp. 23–58.
Leopold, D.A., Logothetis, N.K., 1999. Multistable phenomena: changing views in percep-
tion. Trends Cogn. Sci. 3, 254–264.
Logothetis, N.K., Pauls, J., Augath, M., Trinath, T., Oeltermann, A., 2001. Neurophysiological
investigation of the basis of the fMRI signal. Nature 412, 150–157.
Lumer, E.D., Friston, K.J., Rees, G., 1998. Neural correlates of perceptual rivalry in the
human brain. Science 280, 1930–1934.
Muckli, L., Naumer, M.J., Singer, W., 2009. Bilateral visual ﬁeld maps in a patient with only
one hemisphere. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 106, 13034–13039.
Pardo, J.V., Pardo, P.J., Janer, K.W., Raichle, M.E., 1990. The anterior cingulate cortex medi-
ates processing selection in the Stroop attentional conﬂict paradigm. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U. S. A. 87, 256–259.
Parkkonen, L., Andersson, J., Hamalainen, M., Hari, R., 2008. Early visual brain areas reﬂect
the percept of an ambiguous scene. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 105, 20500–20504.
Pitts, M.A., Nerger, J.L., Davis, T.J., 2007. Electrophysiological correlates of perceptual re-
versals for three different types of multistable images. J. Vis. 7, 6.
Polonsky, A., Blake, R., Braun, J., Heeger, D.J., 2000. Neuronal activity in human primary vi-
sual cortex correlates with perception during binocular rivalry. Nat. Neurosci. 3,
1153–1159.
Price, C.J., Friston, K.J., 1997. Cognitive conjunction: a new approach to brain activation ex-
periments. Neuroimage 5, 261–270.
Raichle, M.E., Fiez, J.A., Videen, T.O., MacLeod, A.M., Pardo, J.V., Fox, P.T., Petersen, S.E.,
1994. Practice-related changes in human brain functional anatomy during nonmotor
learning. Cereb. Cortex 4, 8–26.
Rees, G., 2007. Neural correlates of the contents of visual awareness in humans. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 362, 877–886.
Sato, M., Baciu, M., Loevenbruck, H., Schwartz, J.L., Cathiard, M.A., Segebarth, C., Abry, C.,
2004. Multistable representation of speech forms: a functional MRI study of verbal
transformations. Neuroimage 23, 1143–1151.
Seghier, M., Dojat, M., Delon-Martin, C., Rubin, C., Warnking, J., Segebarth, C., Bullier, J.,
2000. Moving illusory contours activate primary visual cortex: an fMRI study.
Cereb. Cortex 10, 663–670.
Sterzer, P., Kleinschmidt, A., 2007. A neural basis for inference in perceptual ambiguity.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 104, 323–328.
Sterzer, P., Kleinschmidt, A., Rees, G., 2009. The neural bases of multistable perception.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 310–318.
Taylor, M.M., Aldridge, K.D., 1974. Stochastic processes in reversing ﬁgure perception.
Percept. Psychophys. 16, 9–25.
Tian, F., Tu, S., Qiu, J., Lv, J.Y., Wei, D.T., Su, Y.H., Zhang, Q.L., 2011. Neural correlates of
mental preparation for successful insight problem solving. Behav. Brain Res. 216,
626–630.
Tong, F., Engel, S.A., 2001. Interocular rivalry revealed in the human cortical blind-spot
representation. Nature 411, 195–199.
Tong, F., Meng, M., Blake, R., 2006. Neural bases of binocular rivalry. Trends Cogn. Sci. 10,
502–511.
Warren, R.M., Gregory, R.L., 1958. An auditory analogue of the visual reversibleﬁgure. Am.
J. Psychol. 71, 612–613.
Wilke, M., Logothetis, N.K., Leopold, D.A., 2006. Local ﬁeld potential reﬂects perceptual
suppression in monkey visual cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 103, 17507–17512.
Wojciulik, E., Kanwisher, N., 1999. The generality of parietal involvement in visual atten-
tion. Neuron 23, 747–764.
Zeki, S., 1980. The representation of colours in the cerebral cortex. Nature 284, 412–418.
Zeki, S., 2008. Splendors and Miseries of the Brain: Love, Creativity and the Quest for
Human Happiness. Wiley-Blackwell.
